Embracing the Polish plumber: (belated) solidarity or (naked) self-interest?

This spring marks the fourth anniversary of the biggest single enlargement of the EU. The scope of the European project has spread dramatically both geographically and functionally, but has the extension of its four ‘founding’ freedoms – the movement of goods, services, capital and people – kept pace?

 

In May 2004, implementation of the principle of free movement of people was severely limited by the use of ‘transitional arrangements’ to restrict the mobility of workers from the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe for up to seven years (in all EU-15 countries except in Ireland, Sweden and the UK). Just over halfway through this ‘transition’ period, where do we stand?

 

Research shows that those Member States which decided to open their labour markets to former Communist countries have gained rather than lost as a result (although this is hotly disputed by some). Migrant workers in these countries have contributed significantly to the growth of their economies, relieving labour and skills shortages, and spurring further job creation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, they have not stolen jobs from the ‘locals’ but rather taken on jobs they deemed unattractive.

 

Despite this, both Ireland and the UK reversed their policies by closing their job markets to Bulgarians and Romanians in 2007. This was mainly due to negative perceptions of the impact of migration on public welfare systems (especially in the UK) and of the potential migrants from these countries themselves. Elsewhere, concerns about crime have been uppermost, prompting demands for a tougher stance on cross-border mobility, most notably in Italy.

 

However, some other EU Member States have recently started opening up their labour markets to the new countries. Is this out of (belated) solidarity or (naked) self-interest?

 

Fears of a mass East-West migration in the wake of enlargement have proved largely unfounded, as they did in the case of the Southern enlargement 20 years earlier: in the first quarter of 2005, the proportion of EU-10 migrants in the working age population within the EU-15 ranged from as little as 0.1% in France and the Netherlands to 2% in Ireland.

 

Even countries which were adamantly opposed to EU-10 migration at the start, such as Austria and Germany, are changing tack: both countries have been gradually opening their markets to an ever-growing number of sectors and trades. Indeed, the once demonised ‘Polish plumber’ has become a precious commodity for many – even in France, whose government has just decided to lift the restrictions it adopted in 2004 for the eight Central and Eastern European countries which joined then (although those imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 remain in place).

 

Mobility flows are clearly subject to the dynamics of supply and demand. So are we witnessing the emergence of a single market that genuinely embraces (inter)mobility of people?

 

A similar and parallel cost/benefit analysis of the free movement of workers is now raising concerns in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in countries which have experienced sizeable outward migration, such as Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Since the 2004 ‘Big Bang’, most new Member States’ economies have grown at a rate the older ones can only dream of, but it has been suggested that it could have been even faster if more workers had been available.

 

The outflow of (predominantly young) skilled and unskilled workers has thus prompted some unexpected rethinking of the benefits of labour mobility, as governments in Central and Eastern Europe grapple with a shortage of workers. Some are looking across their Eastern borders for a solution, while others are considering introducing safeguard measures to protect their own labour markets from further outflows.

 

Yet none has so far come to the conclusion that mobility is a liability, and some are even taking a pro-active approach to luring back the ‘lost’ workforce by introducing initiatives to tackle their current labour shortages.

 

In Poland, the ruling Civic Platform - which made ‘winning back migrants’ a central plank of its successful electoral campaign last year - has recently tabled an action plan entitled ‘The Return’. This package includes an amnesty scheme for those who have failed to pay taxes in Poland whilst working abroad; an information campaign on issues such as housing, loans and start-ups; the launch of a government website (with an online job centre); the publication of a ‘A Handbook for Re-emigrants’; and the introduction of other targeted services, including adverts in British papers to entice Poles back ‘home’.

 

Praiseworthy as these initiatives are, one should not forget the lessons learned by Ireland. It was the rise of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, with its impressive economic performance in the 1990s, rather than dedicated policy measures, which both lured Irish migrants back to their home country and attracted new migrants.

 

Indeed, the tide is already turning in relation to the EU-10: there is evidence that inflows of new workers are weakening, with Central and Eastern European migrants returning ‘home’. The new Member States are themselves becoming attractive destinations for workers as wage gaps between East and West narrow and standards of living converge, albeit slowly. In this respect, too, frontiers in Europe are fading away – a process to which enlargement has contributed significantly.

 

But this is not the whole story. Demographic trends in the EU mean it urgently needs more migration, not less, and not only from within its own borders. The figures speak for themselves: Europe has long been suffering from very low birth rates and low fertility in the former Eastern bloc has been a constant phenomenon for decades.

 

The challenge for the enlarged EU is to find a pragmatic yet principled approach that respects the right to free movement of people and attracts more migrants from outside the EU. Riding the populist anti-immigration wave may bring short-term electoral gains, but does nothing to alleviate or solve the medium- and long-term problems facing European societies, East and West.

 

By the same token, immigration laws are often not the major factor in determining mobility. Migrants’ decisions on whether and where to move are driven by various, complex expectations and calculations, especially when it comes to skilled workers. An effective migration policy, in other words, needs to be supported by a consistent, integration policy and more inclusive social provisions targeted at helping all the less-advantaged groups in society.

 

Here, too, the EU needs a broader vision of its own future in a globalised economy, and consequent sustainable common approaches. Otherwise, future migrants will bypass Europe and go where they feel more welcome.