Where have all the flowers gone? Europe's strategic puzzle in the Mediterranean

This autumn, Europe’s foreign-policy makers will be confronted with tough choices on an increasingly complex situation around the Mediterranean. The paths of change lead in different directions, and instability will persist for much longer than had been anticipated. With hindsight, images of the fighting and bloodshed in Libya and Syria, or the military response to demonstrations in Bahrain characterise the events of 2011 better than the jasmine flower.

 

A largely absent United States and an increasingly present and assertive Turkey further complicate the strategic environment. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to North African countries this week signalled a departure from Turkey’s primary focus on influencing the Western policy consensus in favour of unilateral steps, highlighted by Ankara’s support of Palestinian independence and the strained relationship with Israel.

 

In light of these dynamics, the EU and its members need to hone their strategy and operative approach for transformation in the Arab world. European assistance strategies will have to differentiate more by country and be prepared to help economic recovery even if progress on the democracy agenda remains weak.

 

The Arab revolutions have mostly been built on three related but not fully compatible claims. First, protesters have called for more accountability and participation. So far, the quest for ‘democracy’ has mostly resulted in de-legitimising the previous regimes and ruling clans. Democratic governance is, at best, in the making; nowhere have its norms and institutions been secured and implemented yet.

 

Secondly, the Arab peoples were demanding social justice and economic opportunity. Rising inequality and lack of opportunity are probably the most relevant drivers of change. The best-educated younger Arab generation in history suffers from high unemployment and the lack of a perspective for themselves and their families.

 

So far, the impact of the revolutions has made matters worse. Tourism and foreign investments are falling; markets are still not transparent and are mis-regulated. International assistance remains below expectations, as does the capacity to absorb financial assistance. Broad trade liberalisation with the EU, however difficult to negotiate anyway, would require the implementation of thorough political and economic reforms. Thus, the new governments’ delivery will fall short of their constituencies’ crucial expectations; as a consequence, social tensions are likely to grow.

 

Thirdly, a key motive has been the demand for respect and dignity, in the sense of equality under the law, respect for values and traditions and for self-determination. In part targeted against widespread corruption, this demand calls for a government for the people by the people, based on their values and traditions, rather than on one adopted from the European model.

 

In short, the current imbroglio across Europe’s southern periphery does not lend itself to a broad application of the ‘more for more’ approach, which makes assistance and support conditional on the progress of a transition towards democracy.

 

Reviewing the ‘Arab Spring’ six months later, no two countries follow the same path. In terms of a transition towards democracy, Tunisia seems to be the only promising case for the time being. In spite of the extension of the state of emergency until after the October elections, the outlook for electoral democracy, a separation of powers, independent judiciary and market liberalisation is promising.

 

In Egypt, in several ways the pivotal actor in the Arab world, electoral reform and elections will happen but may lead to a power arrangement among the principal players: the National Democratic Party, the Muslim Brotherhood and the military. This will constrain the prospects of inclusive and effective governance and would likely frustrate the large popular movement in the country, sending a sober message to many in the Arab world who view Egypt as the benchmark of what could be achieved.

 

Morocco, with its gradual top-down reform, will not become a champion of transition, either. Benefitting from the relatively larger popular legitimacy of monarch and public institutions, the current ruler and his government may well be able to maintain political stability.

 

As for Libya, once the fighting has ended, the country can be expected to develop at least a bicameral governance structure based on a parliament representing the people and some form of a tribal caucus, representing the traditional local elites and acknowledging their leading role in the struggle against Gaddafi.

 

Winds of change have reached the streets of Algeria, but protests seem to lack critical mass under the repressive rule of state and army, and fear of a return of civil war. If the regime in Algiers should eventually fail, the recurrence of violence appears to be more likely than the reform path of either Morocco or Tunisia.

 

The market economy, jobs and social justice face similar difficulties in North Africa, the outlook, however, appears somewhat more promising. Tunisia and Morocco should be able to turn relative political stability into economic opening and better governance of their market economy, taking advantage of the assistance available to them.

 

In the short term, their greatest needs centre on fiscal stabilisation, which is also a high priority in Egypt. Here, if a new president and parliament achieve acceptance and stability, the Egyptian economy could benefit greatly from a thorough improvement in economic governance. Libya after Gaddafi could follow the same path, provided tribal elites refrain from rent-seeking practices and use oil and gas revenues wisely.

 

In all of these processes, European assistance policies could make a significant difference. Rather than applying broad conditionality, a differentiated approach should be followed, seeking functional linkages, for example between market organisation and respective legal norms and systems.

 

Given the rather bleak outlook for genuine democracies in the region, assistance strategies should focus on the social and economic agenda. To keep the balance, special democracy funds should be made available on top of assistance packages and these should be clearly linked to progress made in this area.

 

Further to the East, prospects for democracy and the market economy seem even more diffuse. Legitimacy of rule is increasingly questioned in the Middle East; eventually neither the Gulf rulers nor the leaders of Iran will be spared from the need to reform their governance and institutions to maintain the consent of the governed. For the time being, Europe should focus primarily on North Africa. It is here that the potential for change is largest and that the externalities of stagnation or regression will play out most directly for Europe.