The German Presidency of the EU has already been heralded by many as a success, but its toughest test is yet to come. The final verdict on its six months’ at the helm will depend on its ability to broker an outline deal at the 21-22 June summit on a replacement for the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty - and what the precise terms of that agreement are.
With less than two weeks to go, it is still difficult to predict the exact outcome of the summit. But there are signs that many EU leaders are increasingly tempted to opt for a political ‘quick fix’ at almost any price, and without a broader public debate. This is a temptation that Europe’s politicians should resist.
The degree of secrecy surrounding the talks between national capitals on the mandate for the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference is understandable - and arguably even necessary: after all, these are still “negotiations over the negotiations”, with a view to holding the IGC during the Portuguese Presidency in the second half of this year.
However, while persuading EU leaders to sign up to a deal which has been almost entirely ‘pre-cooked’ before the IGC begins would give German Chancellor Angela Merkel the ‘triumph’ she is working so hard to achieve at the June summit, it could turn out to be a short-term victory with potentially serious long-term consequences.
Significant institutional reform is vital if an EU of 27 is to function effectively and continue to expand. The death blows dealt to the Constitution by France and the Netherlands have left Europe’s politicians badly bruised. Once a way out of the current ‘crisis’ has been found, few will be willing to return to this issue again any time soon. This means any further institutional reforms are likely to be off the table for many years. EU leaders should therefore strive to achieve as much progress as possible now, rather than producing a fudged deal. (In this respect, incidentally, the revision clause may turn out to be the most important element of the whole text.)
It is striking, for instance, that the preconditions for the negotiation are being set not only, or even primarily, by the two Nay-sayers’ - which would be somewhat understandable - but mainly by EU governments which have ‘suspended’ ratification of a treaty they signed up to three years ago and never openly reneged on since. This does not bode well for the future.
Too much secrecy and too many backroom deals also risk conveying the impression that Europe’s politicians have learned nothing from the two No votes in 2005. And while a quick-fix might be enough to avoid a fresh round of referenda, it is likely to be viewed with suspicion by the public, the media and many national politicians: a painless ratification process via national parliaments cannot therefore be taken for granted
Agreeing a deal in June which only leaves the Portuguese Presidency with the task of ‘crossing the i’s and dotting the t’s’ remains unlikely - and maybe even undesirable: unlikely, because too many political unknowns hang over the outcome of the IGC negotiations (starting with the attitude of the new British Prime Minister); and undesirable because a new treaty deal will have to be carefully crafted to meet a number of different and potentially conflicting requirements.
The reforms must at the same time be: a) broadly consensual, i.e. acceptable to all EU governments; b) functionally effective, i.e. capable of solving the problems they are meant to address; and, given the determination of most EU leaders not to hold another round of popular votes, c) speedily “ratifiable”, i.e. limited enough to avoid referenda unless strictly necessary, with the aim of completing the process before the June 2009 Euro-elections.
The first requirement - consensus at 27 - is far from easy to meet and a rushed agreement can almost certainly only be achieved by taking a lowest common denominator approach, as happened with the March Berlin Declaration. The second - effective solution - depends on the adjustments to be made to the constitutional ‘package’ to meet the first requirement. The third - quick ratification - depends on a number of factors that are difficult to predict at this stage. However, a degree of transparency and the need to win public support for whatever deal is eventually reached - with or without referenda - seems an inescapable precondition of all three.
What can and should be achieved in June is, first and foremost, a clear indication of what can be (re)negotiated at 27 with respect to the institutional ‘package’ agreed at 25 in 2004 and what issues cannot be reopened. The ‘minimalist’ camp must recognise that the 18 countries which have ratified the Constitution will not easily give up on the substance of the original package. For their part, the 18 must realise that some concessions will have to be made. A possible compromise would be to take the Constitutional Treaty as the starting point in terms of substance, and the Nice Treaty as the starting point in terms of form: the resulting ‘amending treaty’ would thus allow both sides to claim victory.
EU leaders should also set a strict timetable for completing the process. A firm deadline always helps to concentrate minds and December 2007 seems reasonable, as all the main issues have already been raised in the run-up to the June summit - and, of course, in the long and detailed discussions in the Convention and ensuing IGC.
Above all, they must resist the temptation to carry on as they have done since the start of this year. After the summit, they will have to ‘go public’ and discuss openly what these reforms are all about and why they are necessary. Both national parliaments and MEPs should be involved in this exercise, have an opportunity to contribute to the debate, and make the case for reform to a broader audience.
Only by doing so will it be possible to meet all three main requirements for a successful reform of the EU institutions. And if the current window of opportunity is missed, it is unlikely to open again for many years to come.