US President Trump’s suspension of military and intelligence aid to Ukraine comes as the definitive confirmation that the US is not trying for a just peace in Ukraine but has sided instead with the aggressor. The glee in Moscow (and Beijing) speaks for itself. Borrowing from Roosevelt’s famous 1941 speech that took the US into World War II, the West is living its “days of infamy”. Only this time, it is for Europeans to decide on their readiness to fight for their deepest held principles and the free world.
Last weekend’s London summit showed that the leaders of Western democratic nations are overcoming the initial grief, denial and anger of this transatlantic rift. Today’s Special European Council will be only the first of many Councils of War to come. In addition to the surge in financing and weapons to Ukraine and in Europe’s defence and war readiness, the way forward requires a common compass with clear points of bearing:
1. European steadfastness, not transatlantic divorce. It would be irresponsible for Europeans to continue to believe in US solidarity and security guarantees for Ukraine, and even for Europe, in current and future circumstances. Yet it would be equally irresponsible to precipitate the transatlantic divorce.
The shedding of past illusions doesn’t mean that the best course of action isn’t still to try to keep the US as close as possible to Europe’s values, interests and own ideas for an acceptable future for Ukraine. While preparing for the worst, Europeans must also look for ways to avoid Trump and Vance slipping further into the Putinist camp. Those are the boundaries within which Europeans must develop their own agency, capacities and autonomy.
2. Uniting the willing, building on NATO and EU structures. In war, resolve will often matter more than rules and frameworks of the past. This is the context where new coalitions of the willing or ‘supra-governmental avantgardes’ can emerge across and above old and defunct boundaries, such as Brexit divisions or past EU-NATO rivalries. This was already seen at the recent London summit and the Paris meeting on 19 February, where an E5+ format, composed of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK and other partners, started taking shape.
Still, Europeans would be ill advised to dismiss the resources of existing institutions and frameworks. NATO remains Europe’s most credible framework for deterrence and military action. To reinforce its effectiveness, Europeans must urgently develop the European pillar of NATO including a new understanding with the US on its military and operational leadership, potentially involving NATO minus US set-ups.
Similarly, the EU and its institutional, financing and operational capacities will be needed more than ever – not less. Yet their effectiveness will depend on curtailing fifth columnists. In the early days of the Brexit negotiations, EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier struck a deal with Victor Orbán that Hungary would not obstruct unity among the EU27. Yet Orbán may now feel further emboldened by Trump. Establishment of a common defence in line with the Treaties’ Article 42(2) TEU is unworkable in present circumstances, but the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) offers the requisite framework to develop EU defence policy institutions, from political coordination to capabilities, while excluding those that are blocking progress.
3. Readying for the most extreme contingencies. Europe’s first task is to show that it fully and completely has Ukraine’s back. Russian President Putin will only come to the table if he sees that Ukraine can fight another year or more. While Putin isn’t “6 months weak”, he likely is 12 to 18 months weak. British and French political and military leaders have for months worked on the possibility of putting boots on the ground and planes in the air. While initially ridiculed, it is now difficult to foresee a lasting ceasefire without such a commitment.
It is no coincidence that Britain and France are in the lead: as Europe’s only nuclear powers they must be at the centre of a new European security architecture including regional nuclear deterrence, with France in particular disposing of full doctrinal and operational autonomy to deter and act, from both the air and sea.
In all likelihood, in a post-ceasefire context, Putin will be tempted to test Europe’s resolve. A security guarantee is not a peace operation, it is fundamentally about deterrence. If Putin were to violate a ceasefire and attack Ukraine again, Russia would be at war with Europe. But this same risk exists if Europe abandons Ukraine now. EU leaders must remember that this same security guarantee is also implicit in the promise they made that Ukraine will one day become an EU member state.
It’s a moment for clarity on principles and commitments. In this, European leaders can take strength from Roosevelt’s emphatic insistence in 1941 that posterity will endorse the right and courageous stance.
Georg Emil Riekeles is Associate Director at the European Policy Centre.
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