European Union leaders demonstrated at a special summit on defence on March 6 that they are finally waking up to the urgency of providing more support to Ukraine and launching a surge in their own defence spending and capabilities. They issued the most ambitious call to arms in EU history, recognising “an existential challenge” to Europe, which finds itself increasingly alone and is no longer able to rely on the transatlantic security guarantee that has protected the continent since World War II.
However, EU leaders failed to announce an immediate extra military support package for Ukraine, which EU officials had been trying to mobilise. And they avoided mention of joint borrowing to front-load accelerated defence efforts due to political sensitivities in Germany and other northern member states. They must return to both those issues rapidly to be credible.
The summit, which began with a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was held not just under the shadow of Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and growing covert warfare against Europe. But it also follows US President Donald Trump’s public haranguing of Zelenskyy and cut-off of US arms supplies and intelligence sharing to try to force Ukraine to accept a ceasefire negotiation largely on Russian terms and without US security guarantees. As they were meeting, Trump cast fresh doubt on Washington’s commitment to NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence clause, saying he would not come to the aid of European allies that did not meet their defence spending pledges. “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them,” he said.
Leaders called for new defence investments both at national and EU level, and welcomed the Commission’s plans to invoke national let-out clauses to exempt additional defence spending from member states’ deficit calculations under EU fiscal rules. Morale was boosted by a provisional agreement between Germany’s likely future coalition partners on a massive new debt-funded defence and infrastructure programme and a loosening of the country’s constitutional debt straitjacket, which could be enacted within two weeks. The stunning reversal of Berlin’s previously frugal stance highlights both the changed threat assessment of conservative chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz and his understanding that Europe must build an independent defence and deterrence capability on the assumption that the United States may no longer be at its side. That has prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to offer a strategic dialogue on how France’s nuclear deterrent might be extended to protect European allies, which Poland, Denmark and Lithuania welcomed.
The EU leaders said all the right things about capability priority areas for action at EU level: compatible with NATO targets, including air and missile defence, deep precision strike artillery, drones and anti-drone systems, strategic enablers including space, military mobility, cyber, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. They stressed the importance of aggregating demand for defence equipment, harmonising requirements and joint procurement to reduce costs, and ensuring standardisation and interoperability of European forces. They pressed the European Investment Bank to invest more in defence and security, and asked the Commission for measures to mobilise private financing for the defence industry.
However, they still face nagging who-does-what institutional disputes, with several states resisting giving more power over defence to the Commission, as well as industrial rivalries and production capacity constraints. Three years into the full-scale war in Ukraine, European industry is still waiting for long-term contracts to expand.
Despite pro-Russian Hungary’s jarring dissent, 26 leaders issued a statement of principled support for Ukraine setting out Europe’s terms for peace negotiations and future European security arrangements. They recognised the importance of working with like-minded non-EU partners, opening the door to a coalition of the willing to support Ukraine and potentially offer forces to guarantee its security after any agreement to end the fighting.
All in all, this summit was a significant step forward for European defence despite its shortcomings. It was a glass half full, but time to fill the other half is short.
Paul Taylor is a Senior Visiting Fellow with the Europe in the World Programme at the EPC.
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