As US support for Ukraine declines, leaders of Europe’s liberal democracies have rightly decided to step into the breach. They are working to support and guarantee Ukraine’s security, most probably outside NATO, and build up their own capacity to act independently in defence. This will entail painful trade-offs and sacrifices requiring much, much more money within the constraints of an ongoing security dependence on the US.EU agencyBut the EU’s leaders do control an important potential next step, which could have a lasting effect: Ukraine’s accession. By letting Ukraine join the EU in the near term, rather than postponing it to some distant future that might never come, the EU could demonstrate its commitment to Ukraine’s European future. A number of member states have called for fast accession but under the current glacial accession method, candidates have to meet dozens of benchmarks for the gradual opening and closing of different “chapters” of EU law, with the final (unanimous) decision only taken after this slow and painful process. This kicks Ukrainian accession far down the road, which may have been the intention for some.Ukrainian membership is a categorical imperative now so it is time for the EU to force the pace. Instead of a long drawn-out process, the process should allow for Kyiv to join quickly. The usual temporary and conditional transition periods and derogations should be a central component of accession, for instance Ukraine would only acquire full voting rights gradually as it fulfils pre-set conditions, with an assessment by majority vote rather than unanimity when these exclusions are no longer needed. Objections based on Ukraine’s cost to the EU budget, freedom of movement of workers, distortion of agricultural markets, or its outsize claim on EU cohesion funds could be defused in this way, while conditional derogations would maintain pressure on Kyiv to reform.One of usFast-tracking Ukraine’s accession would be complicated, contentious and subject to legal challenges. But it can and should be made to work. It would fulfil the promise made to Ukraine at a time of need. It would enable Kyiv to participate in many key decisions that affect its future, and to start benefiting from common funds and programmes. And it would provide part of the complex tapestry of security guarantees Ukraine needs, by extending the mutual assistance clause included in the EU Treaties (Article 42(7) Treaty on the European Union).Ukraine would be able to participate fully in all defence and security initiatives – but this benefit would be mutual. Europe needs Ukraine’s capabilities to hold Russia in check. Ukraine’s accession would also strengthen the voices inside the EU that believe that Europe must stand up to Russia. It would send a clear and irreversible signal to Moscow, and the rest of the world, that Ukraine is part of Europe, and that Europe is in it together.Donald Trump will not like this idea, given his distaste for the EU and cosiness with Russia, which will do its utmost to neuter Ukrainian independence and defence capabilities. But Europe must stand its ground: it is in our power to make this happen, and it is Ukraine’s sovereign decision to join. Bringing Ukraine in shows that accession is not just a theoretical promise. That should apply to other candidate countries, too. Other European liberal democracies, the UK and Norway, might feel excluded, so cooperation must be opened up beyond the EU, especially in defence and security. Roadblocks and objectorsSome EU members might object but ‘whatever it takes’ to guarantee Europe’s security must also include Ukraine’s membership now. However, the obvious barrier is unanimity, which is required for accession. Any changes to the accession modalities that could allow a faster process would also need to be taken by unanimity. So is this a pipedream that will never be realised?The conditions now are probably as good as it gets. If we do not manage to progress accession now, it seems unlikely that we will manage in future, when some of the framework conditions will have further deteriorated while some of the pressures will be less acutely felt. If it is a no, we can also start thinking about what that implies for the next steps on Ukraine and in European integration rather than postponing that essential discussion to some unspecified future point in time.Forcing the pace now would expose foot-draggers among liberal democracies by challenging them to oppose it publicly. But we also have the enemies within – governments that align with Putin and Trump against liberal democracy. They are already slowing down the European integration process and might vote against Ukraine’s fast accession, given their true allegiance and narrow national interests. Plan BIn case of a veto, or if any deal accepted by Ukraine ruled out membership, willing members should employ innovative methods to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the EU – a quasi-EU, in parallel to, and aligned with, the EU institutions and mechanisms. Such a super-charged coalition of the willing (or supra-governmental avantgarde) should exclude reticent countries from common programmes and funding. They should start with defence, be open to like-minded countries such as Ukraine, UK and Norway, and should be tied into Article 42(7). In addition, there should be an alliance to relay Kyiv’s voice inside the EU decision-making process, treating Ukraine as if it were a member already. All this would impose a hefty price on those unwilling to move ahead together.It is time for Ukraine, and others, to become an EU member. If blocked, the Union’s liberal democracies must go ahead and create quasi-EU membership that inflicts a high price on those who seek to block enlargement. This not only supports Ukraine but shows that the EU has a decisive role to play in the defence against the current global assault on liberal democracy.
Fabian Zuleege is Chief executive and Chief economist at the EPC.
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