Between the past and the future: unfinished business in the EU and the Balkans

On 26 June 2012, the EU gave Montenegro the green light to start accession talks. With Croatia set to join the EU next year, the enlargement process seems to be on track. But in reality, the pace of the politics of enlargement swings back and forth. Periods of acceleration are often followed by spells of stalemate.

 

This is a result of unfinished business in both the EU and the Balkans. The EU remains committed to enlarging to the Balkans; the geostrategic peace-building logic is still there. But all too often it shows cold feet. The Balkan countries are committed to their ‘Europeanisation’: nearly all political parties claim to have converted to this path. But frequently politics in the region is marred by the ghosts of the recent past. The end result is that the enlargement process moves forward at a snail’s pace, and the Commission has to resort to much ingenuity to keep the momentum going.

 

Unlike Zagreb, Podgorica will have to start negotiating the last chapters first: chapters 23 and 24, on the judiciary and fundamental rights, and on justice, freedom and security respectively. Starting with the hardest chapters reveals all the EU’s reservations about the Balkan countries’ preparedness to join the EU. Now these countries have to demonstrate a track record in the area of negotiation before accession talks can begin. To be fair, it is in the interest of Balkan citizens for their governments and institutions to become examples of full respect of the rule of law. But the emphasis on benchmarks, to be individually set by the Council on the basis of unanimity, gives the process plenty of opportunities to be vetoed by one member state or another, for a variety of reasons which may not always have much to do with the issue at stake.

 

The past couple of years have seen a few examples of member-state interference in a process which, in the 1990s, was driven by the European Commission, leading to suspicions of a ‘creeping nationalisation of enlargement’, as Christophe Hillion has perceptively argued. In turn, this makes the process more unpredictable and undermines the EU’s credibility in the region. Given that the end of these processes will be met by the possibility of a French referendum and questions regarding the EU’s undefined ‘absorption capacity’, the reasons to be doubtful are legitimate, notwithstanding my ultimate optimism.

 

Add to this malaise the troubles in the region, and the picture is far from rosy. The previous enlargement round was at times held hostage to bilateral disputes between one member state and a candidate country, for instance between Italy and Slovenia. Slovenia-Croatia was another appetiser for trouble that could come in the future. The Croatian parliament remarkably voted not to subject the accession process of the other Balkan states to bilateral requests, but the country so far stands alone in making this important gesture. The story of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is well known. The Commission started a High Level Accession Dialogue with Skopje in an effort to clear from the path any possible objections to the country actually starting negotiations: a step which it has been proposing every year since 2009.

 

At the same time, the EU is struggling to keep the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina alive. It is now awaiting renewed commitment from Serbia’s government – once it has been formed – and a greater effort from both sides to keep the process moving. Implementing the agreements reached through the dialogue has become a problem, as both sides seem to return home with different interpretations of the agreements. European capitals are demanding a better track record of implementation, while Belgrade is throwing the ball back into Brussels’s court by asking whether the EU is making Serbia’s accession conditional upon recognition of Kosovo. The EU cannot answer this question, because five EU member states do not recognise independence. Alongside these outstanding statehood questions, there still are a myriad of smaller unresolved bilateral disputes over borders, cadastral records and other legacies of the Balkan wars that would need to be resolved before accession.

 

It is hard to imagine pro-active policies aimed at regional reconciliation when domestic politics is so polarised and contested. Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are two very different countries which share the fact that they have spent much of the past two years paralysed by internal political crises, making a route out of the stalemate hard to plot. Throughout the region, spectres of the past continue to infect political and civic life, blocking the road to renewal and change. The legacy of the recent past, with its yet-to-be addressed animosities, lends itself to manipulation by politicians with shady or clearly objectionable curricula and national-populists.

 

Is there any light at the end of this tunnel? The EU will not turn its back on the 2003 Thessaloniki commitment, however cold or tepid it may appear at a time of crisis. Integrating into the EU remains the only possible path for the Balkans, an enclave within the EU; no other power or country can offer a similar prospect. The Balkans themselves have become a much better place than ten years ago. The transformation these countries have undergone and the reform they have carried out should be viewed as historic achievements. Nationalism is still popular, and an easy trap for the electorate to fall into at a time of unemployment and economic stagnation. But at the same time, there have been changes in attitudes. And even if political leaders still fall too often into the trap of nationalism, they too have come to terms with the EU accession option: political convergence over this has actually never been so broad.

 

Unlike Central Europe, the Balkans have not easily switched to the EU integration prospect; similarly, the EU is not unequivocally embracing enlargement. A visionary conclusion to this

brief contribution to the debate on enlargement may not be possible, but a pinch of realism can help: the unfinished business in the EU and in the Balkans will stay with us, as will the eventual expansion of the EU to include the Balkans. Shall we let it ‘stay’ with us, or shall we embrace the challenge?